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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, by and through

its HOAD COl\ll\IISSION,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

I

vs.
· Case No.
LE\VIS IL DILLREE and
12030
BETTA IL DILLREE,
his wife; and
FIHST N.ATIONAL BANK,
Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

ST ATE ME NT OF FACTS
Hespondents agree with the statement of facts set
forth in appellant's brief.
l

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDG.JIENT IS AMPLY SUPPORTED
BY THE GR.EAT.Ell \V.EIGHT OF THE EYIDENCE.
An analysis of appellant's argument in this case
makes it rather clear that its position is predicated on
the assumption that testimony given by a property owner in a condemnation case is not competent evidence
which can support a verdict. Although the position is not
stated in so many words, it is amply clear from the statements taken from cases cited in appellant's brief that it
only chooses to recognize the testimony of "experts" as
having validity in support of any verdict in a condemnation action.
Appellant's position, condensed in simple terms, is
that a property owner is graciously extended the opportunity of telling the jury what he thinks his property is
worth and what amount, if any, his remaining properties
not taken ha,·e depreciated in value, but that if in some
case a jury should happen to accept the full testimony
of value as given by a property owner the benign and
gracious tolerance extended (by the grace of the condemnor, perhaps
should be immediately withdrawn
and the
owner given to understand that his
really carries no weight at all.

n

Respondents do not subscribe to appellant's position
that only "expert" testimony can support a verdict in a
2

coudenma ti on action nor can they• a buree in this case that
the testimony of the owner, Lewis R. Dillree was incompetent in any respect. This argument, together wiJ1
the cases to be cited, will support respondents' position
that Mr. Dillree's testimony was certainly adequate to
support the verdict and that the testimony of a property
owner, whether there be an additional "expert" witness
or whether his testimony might exceed the values given
by an expert, is recognized as valid under the law.
In the argument before the jury this writer callc<l
attention to the testimony of the three witnesses utilized
by the respondents and pointed out to the jury that, of
all of the witnesses who took the stand, the testimony of
Lewis R. Dillree on the matter of values and damages
probably was based upon the best foundation from the
standpoint of experience and knowledge of values.
Dillree took the witness stand and testified
that he had been a mink rancher for some 15 years, haYing run an average of between 1,500 to 1,600 mink each
year (Tr. 18). He testified that he had purchased the
subject property in 1959 (Tr. 19) and that he had remodeled or had initially built practically all of the structures on the property. In this respect it should be kept
in mind that the condemnation proceeding against
and l\Irs. Dillree involved the acquisition of substantially
all of their holdings in the Echo area and that the greater
portion of the values inYolved were those of improvements located on the lands taken.
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.Mr. Dillree itemized each and every improYement
taken, furnishing construction details, the age and history of each improvement (Tr. 19), and pointed out the
details relating to yard improvements, utilities furnishing services to the properties and similar matters. He
stated that, after acquiring the properties, he personally
completely remodeled the home (Tr. 19) and that he had
built the 8 large mink sheds at the rate of approximately
one each year, commencing in 1960 and terminating
construction of the last one in 1968 (Tr. 27-31).
l\lr. Dillree in his testimony and on a separate chart
( Exh. 7) valued each and every improvement, together
with the land taken and the remaining lands damaged
by the taking, in giving his total appraisal of $35,075.00.
This case does not present a situation where the
property owners' appraisal is completely out of line with
that of his expert witnesses. By comparison, 1\Ir. llaum's
total appraisal was $33,000.00, and that of Mr. Jensen
was $33,436.00. It seems that the real complaint of the
appellant in this matter is that the verdict should be reduced by $1,639.00, so that it would be no higher than
that of the highest expert witness utilized by the respondents. However, it can clearly be seen that the real
complaint of the respondent, in view of the relatiYely
small additional amount which the jury awarded lwer
and above the highest testimony given by l\lr. Dillree's
expert witnesses, is that the verdict of none of the witnesses for the respondents should stand. It is inconcefrable that the appellant is only concerned with the
4

$1,o3£>.00 difference between i\lr. Jensen's valuation of

and l\lr. Dillree's testimony of $35,075.00.
It would be well to look at Mr. Dillree's testimony,
i11clu<li11g his valuations and his experience to furnish
,-,.did testimony in the case. On direct examination i\Ir.
Dillree made it very clear (Tr. 3i-33) that he understood that the valuations were tied to the year rnu8 arn1
that his measure of values was tied to prices in the market place:

Q. And we are also taking about a price in
the market place that a buyer and seller would
arrive at?

A. Yes.
Q. Have you attempted to so value the
properties on that basis ?

A. I did.
Dillree valued his home, garage au<l other
Luildings separately. In valuing the 8 large mink sheds
which constituted a substantial item in the total valu;;
picture, he pointed out that the oldest shed was 8 years
old and that the last shed had been built but one year
prior to the condemnation (Tr. 33-34<). He explained
that the sheds were in very good condition and that none
of the structures had been abused or damaged in any
way. He valued the mink sheds in their "as is" condition at $1.50 per square foot. To point out the correct
appraisal standard that he utilized in valuing these sheds
the following reference is made to the proceedings (Tr.
35-:Jfi) :

5

I

Q. In using a figure of $1.50 per square foot
on these mink sheds, as of 1968, does that represent what it would cost to replace the sheds as
new sheds(

A. No sir.

Mll.

"r ALL: \Ve object to that.

THE COURT: It is his estimate as to what
it would cost, is that right?

)lR. FCLLER: I am asking his opinion if

this is new cost.

THE COURT: I think I will let him answer.
A. No sir, it would not be new cost.
)fr. Dillree explained that he had built all of the

mink sheds himself and that, after leaving Echo an<l
moving to l\lorgan, he had built and replaced an equal
amount of square feet of mink shed area within the past
year prior to the trial (Tr. 35). Further, he pointed out
that he was familiar with building costs in the area, having worked for many years for a Mr. Atkin in building
mink sheds prior to building those of his own. Also, as
previously pointed out (Tr. rn) he had remodeled his
home himself.
Dillree further pointed out that he had had experience in buying real estate in the general area and
was familiar with land Yalues and that he had recently
purchased real estate similar to the land taken in the
proceedings. His valuation of the lands taken '"as based
in part upon such experience (Tr. 37) .
6

111 giving his analysis of the two small tracts of land
left on each side of the freeway he clearly indicated the
reasons why each of those long and narrow piece:; of
land had practically no market value, citing the long and
1ia1Tuw condition of the pieces which were left, their
lack of access to river water for pasturage purposes, ancl
the fad that the piece on the east side of the freeway
\\'as sawlwiched in between the freeway and the railroad
(Tr. 39-40, 45).

It is submitted that his knowledge of land and improvement values in the area, particularly since he was
familiar with the age and condition and construction
eosts of similar improvements-in addition to the improvements at issue-adequately qualify him better
than any of the other experts who testified in the case.
It is submitted that his testimony was certainly worthy
of full belief, particularly since it was so nearly corroborated by his two expert witnesses .

.Judge Nelson instructed the jury concerning l\Ir.
Dillree' s testimony according to the standard instruction
generally given in condemnation cases throughout lJ tab
(Tr. 243) :

Instruction No. 15
In this matter one of the landowners, has
been permitted and allowed to render his opinion
as to the value of his property. Said owner has
not qualified as an expert witness on entluation
or value nor has he rendered an opinion based 011
his professional education, knowledge
expericnee of market value, nor does he, m order to

7

testify, need be engaged in buying and selling
real estate. Said landowner has been permitted to
testify by reason of the fact that he is the owner
of the property in question.
In considering the weight to be given to his
testimony on value, you may consider his bias,
personal involvement, experience au<l qualifications to testifv on land value as well as the reasons and basi; for his opinion.' You may give such
opinion whatever weight, in light of the circumstances and eYidence adduced, you may deem fit.
The foregoing instruction made it clear to the jury
that it could weigh Mr. Dillree's testimony from se\'eral
tandanls and that they could give it the weight they felt
it deserved. Although juries seldom accept a landowner's testimony in total, the jury in this case felt inclined
to believe .M.r. Dillree' s testimony as against that of the
other witnesses. It is submitted that it had adequate
grounds for so doing.
It should be noted that appellant took no exception
whatsoever to the giYing of the Instruction No. 15.
However, in its brief it attacks the Instruction by a
round-about approach.
It is often helpful in a case of this type to make au
actual comparison of the appraisal of a property owner
with that of the so-called "experts" utilized by the appellant. Appellant utilized two appraisers-1\Ir. Grant
E. Nielsen, one of its staff appraisers who was on the
regular payroll of the appellant, and Mr. Nate . A.
Smith, a Salt Lake City fee appraiser.
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.Mr. Nielsen took the witness staud, iutroduce<l uumcrous photographs of the various improvements a11d

portions of the properties, discussed comparabic
sales of lands and residences in the area, and went
through the regular routine testimony of an expert witness-but he simply gave a composite total of all of the
lmil<lings constituting the improvements in the amount
of
(Tr. 208), without yiviny any value /Jreaf,·
down on tJhe individual improvements. Mr. Smith iHdulge<l in an even more unpardonable appraisal error i11
that he, after going through the same general appraisal
approach, finally admitted that his determination of a
.J.O ',1 cleprecia ted value which he assigned to the imp rm ements was based upon never haviny examined the
interior of a single improvement. On cross examination
he testified:
0Ll1cr

"Q. Now if I ha Ye put together the proper
chronology of your appearances on this property,
you never ever went iuside those mink sheds, did
you?
No, Sir.

Q. And you iie,·er ever went inside the
home?

A. No sir.
Q. And you never eYer went inside or
through any of the other buildings (

A. No sir, just around them.·' (Tr. lDO)

* * * * * *

You were simply working from statistics
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or figures or that type of information, were you
not?
A. Yes sir.
So that wheu you used a depreciated figure of 40 percent to the home, and 40 percent to
the mink sheds, you are not giving that as a result of your observation?
A. I was basing it on the economic life of
the property, and the estimated remaining life.
But not on your obserYation 1
A. Not on observation. (Tr. 191)

l\Ir. Smith pointed out that he did not actually get
his assignment to appraise the properties until February
of 1969, some eleven months after the condemnation
occurred (Tr. 154), and that by the time he went over
the property all of the buildings had actually been destroyed!

Q. And you got the assignment in February
of 1969?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And this was about a year, nearly a year

after the taking?
A. Yes.

Q. And in February of 1969, is it not true
that all of the buildings had been wiped off the
property?
A. Yes, they were.

MR. FULLER: No further questions.

(Tr. 192)

10

In addition to the foregoing type of testimony furnished to the jury, Mr. Nielsen and Mr. Smith took the
position that the two small isolated and severed tract::> of
land on either side of the freeway sustained either none
or very little damage in value . .Both claimed there was
110 damage to the 2.66 acre strip of land located between
the freeway and the railroad (Tr. 179, 208, 2:29). This
testimony, which simply echoes the adamant stand of the
llureau of Public Roads, could only insult the intelligence of any jury having heard all of the testimony and
realizing that the 2.66 acre tract of land was left as a
narrow strip of land between the freeway and the railroad, being 130 feet wide on one end and 120 feet wide
on the other end and having a total distance of 950 feet
(see Trial .Map). Further, as previously pointed out,
irrigating this long narrow strip of land and considering
its location, proximity to the freeway and the railroad,
lack of access to water for livestock, and other disadrnntages, rendered the property practically worthless.
Similarly, the small tract on the westerly side of the free"·ay was approximately 75 feet wide at one end and 100
feet wide at the other end, and was approximately .J.30
feet long. It also had practically identical disadvantages.
This writer submits that it is unbeliernble that so-called
"experts" could and would testify that both pieces had
sustained no damages or minimum damages as occurred
at this trial.
Plaintiff's assertion that the judgment is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence is premised
upon a novel conception of the law to the effect that the
11

testimony of a landowner will not, as a matter of law,
support a jury verdict. The novelty of such a contention
becomes apparent when it is realized that plaintiff has
not directly challenged the right of a landowner to give
his opi11ion as to the damages suffered in a condemnation
action nor has plaintiff attacked the qualifications of the
landowner and the nature of his testimony.
Support of plaintiff's iwvel theory rests primarily
with the California case of People v. Hayward Buildi11y
1llatcrials Company, 28 Cal. Rptr. 782 ( l!Jo3). Plaintiff quotes from that rnse to the effect than an award
less thau the lowest value testified to by an expert witness is not supported by the evidence. In that case the
jury awarded a figure between the state's two expert
appraisers. The defendant argued that the testimony of
the state's lowest witness should be disregarded for the
reason that it was the product of an improper appraisal
method. Therefore, the defendant reasoned, the jury
verdict was below any testimony whatsoever. In deciding the case, the court assumed the validity, for purposes of argument, of defendant's contention that an
award is without evidentiary support if less than the lowest value testified to by an expert witness. However, the
l'.ourt refused to strike the testimony of the state's lowest
appraiser and thereby left standing a jury verdict in an
amount between the values testified to by the state's two
appraisers. In so doing the court never concerned itself
with the validity of the defendant's concept of evidentiary support.
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Of even greater significance is the fact that Llw
llayn:ard case did not involve testimony by the lan<lom1er or any nonexpert. A careful reading of the case
will disclose that the court did not intend any emphasis
upon the word "expert," but merely inserted that word
as an indication of the source of most opinion testimony
on rnlue. Likewise, with the two cases cited by that defendant, People ex. rel., Dep't. of Public 1Vorks v. lllcCullouyh, 100 Cal. App. 2d IOI, 233 P. 2d 37 (Sic)
( ]!)50) and Redevelopment Agency of City of Sacramento v. iJI·odell, 177 Cal. App. 2d 321, 2 Cal. Rptr.
245 (I UGO), no reference is made to testimony by landowners or nonexpert witnesses. One case involved averdict above the testimony of any witness and the other
case involved a verdict below the testimony of any witness.
The position of the California courts is laid out in
the case of San Francisco Ba;i; Area Rapid Transit Dist.
1'. 11'/ c/\.eeyan, 71 Cal. Rptr. 204 ( 1968). As a preface
to its holding, that court discussed the distinction between the appellant's contention that the verdict was
"against the law" and "excessive" and the weighing of
conflicting evidence to determine the "insufficiency of
the evidence." (In the instant case plaintiff's argument
is cloaked in terms of "insufficiency of the evidence" but
is actually an argument that a landowner's testimony
will uot support a verdict "as a matter of law.") In addressing itself to the question of whether the Yerdict
could be supported as a matter of law, the court said on
page 211:
13

'"In an action for condemnation, the owner is a
competent witness as to the fair market value of
his interest ( citmg authority). The lessees testified that the fair market value of their interest
was $81,000.00. This testimony alone would preclude the appellate court from finding that the
was "agaiust the law," even though the
lessees acknowledged inexperience in the car
wash busmess reflected on his testimony and
might well haye l?een determinative on the question of the ''insufficieucy of the evidence."
Plaintiff's brief tends to create some confusion regarding the right of a landowner to testify concerning
the value of his land in a condemnation action. This
issue 'ms recently before the New _Mexico Supreme
Court in the case of State of New 1llexico v. Chavez, 80
X. M. 394<, -1<56 P. 2d 868, 870 (1969). In adopting the
rnle permitting such testimony the court stated:
"Appellant concedes that the prevailing rule permits an owner to testify concerning the value of
his land both before and after a taking by cou<lemna ti on (citing authority) . It argues, howeYer, that because the rule has been stated as one
of practical necessity. * * * we should adopt the
rule followed by a minority of jurisdictions which
denies the right of an owner to testify concerning
the value of his property taken or damaged by
the sm,ereign through the use of eminent domain.

* * *"

The rio·ht
of an owner to testifv' concernin!! the
b
Yalue of his property taken and damaged in an action
under the law of eminent domain was upheld by this
Court in the case of Salt Lake & F. R. Co. 'l'. Schramm,
14

;)() C tah 53, 189 P. 90 ( 1920). More recently, this Court
again affirmed the landowner's right to testify in the
case of Provo River Water User's Ass'n. v. Carlson, 103
Ctah 93, 133 P. 2d 777 (1943). Similarly, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the right of a property owner to testify concerning the value of property
which he occupies and operates. Telluride Pou:er Co. v.
IVilliams, 164 F. 2d 685 (10th Cir. 1947).
If a landowner is to be permitted to testify concerning the rnlue of property taken and damaged, it would
seem logical that such testimony would be efficacious,
and to be efficacious, such testimony must be capable, as
a matter of law, of supporting a jury Yerdict. Numerous
cases can be found where the testimony of a landowner
has supported a jury verdict.

In the case of United States v. 3.698.63 Acres of
Land, Burleiyh, Emmons and 1llorton Counties, State
of X orth Dakota, 416 F. 2d 65, 66 (8th Cir. 1969), the
court upheld jury Yerdicts which were in excess of the
rnlues placed upon land by the landowners' owu appraisers. One defendant obtained an award of $rn7,:wo.oo after his expert witness testified to damages of
onlv $128,000.00. Another defendant obtained an award
of $34,500.00 as compared with his two experts' testimony of $32,.500.00 and $31,450.00. In both instances
two landowners had testified to figures in excess of the
awards. One landowner had testified that he arriYed at
his figures on the basis of " ... mostly the use of the lanJ
--what its worth to me .... "Another had based his testi-
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mony, in part, upon offers from people who had heard
of the Oahe Dam and were under a misconception as to
what land would not be inundated. Nevertheless, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, as a matter
of law, it could not say that the owners' opinions on land
ntlue wholly lacked weight.
Likewise, in the case of State of New 1llexico v.
Chavez, 80 N . .M. 39.J., 456 P. 2d 868 ( 1969), the owner's opinion on damages supported the jury verdict.
There the testimony of the landowner's sole expert witness was stricken. The award of $25,000.00 was upheld
on the basis of the $35,000.00 figure testified to by the
landowner himself.
The plaintiff has cited the case of Weber Basin
1Vater Conservancy District v. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79,
328 P. 2d 730 ( 1958), ostensibly to show that a litigant
is bound by the lowest (or highest) testimony which it
offers-especially if the corroborating testimony is gfren by a nonexpert. Still, the plaintiffs admit the soundness of the standard jury instruction which gives the
jury the prerogative of believing one witness as against
many, or of believing many witnesses as against one.
The plaintiff would like the Skeen case to say that
a11 owner's testimony of damages in a condemnation case
could never form the basis to support a jury's finding.
IloweYer, the Skeen case merely held that there was au
insufficiency of evidence on the issue of severance damages to support the jury verdict in that case. A close
reading of the decision in that case and the briefs of both
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litigants will disclose that the landowner merely testified
that seYerance damage would result; no monetary figure
was ever given as an assessment of severance damage.
Appellant's brief states that there was no specific testimony as to severance damage. Respondent's brief merely
Lakes issue with appellant's statement but fails to refer
to any testimony whatsoever on damage to the remainder.
Contrary to the Skeen case, the owner in lhe instant
case testified in detail as to the amount of his appraisal
and as to the information upon which his values were
based . .Furthermore, the owner's qualifications, which
have never been attacked by the plaintiff, were fully disclosed to the jury. A statement made by this Court in
Salt Lake & U. R. Co. v. Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189
Pac. 90, 92 ( 1920), on the qualifications of a landowner,
is apropos here.
"In cases like the one under consideration the
qualification of witnesses to express an opinion
as to market value necessarily is a question to be
largely determined by the trial judge. If it is
shown that the witness is competent to express al}
opinion as to values, no matter what the source of
the qualifying information may be, he should
permitted to testify. The sources of the witnesses
information may vary according to the peculiar
means or opportunity the witness has of forming
an opinion and judging the premises. 'Ve do not
think any
aood reason can be assigned why a per• h
son who has occupied and used the premises a 11
her life, and has been interested and alert in makill'r
inc1uirv
as to its ya}ue, mav• not be as well
h
•
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qualified to speak as the banker, lawyer, or real
estate man, having more or less to do with sales
and transfers of real property. The means and
extent of the knmdedge of any witness may be
gone into on cross-examination, and rebutted by
the testimony of other competent witnesses, whose
opinions may differ as to value. No rule can be
formulated for determining the means by which
a witness shall acquire the necessary knowledge
to qualify him to speak that will apply in all cases.
If, under all the circumstances, he was in a position to obtain knowledge and form a correct judgment as to values, whether or not by buying, selling, leasing, or using the property for purposes
for which it is adaptable is immaterial, so long as
the jury is given the benefit of the facts upon
which the opinion of the witness is based (citing
authority)."

POINT II
THE JURY \VAS NOT INFLUENCED BY
lHAS AND PREJUDICE.
The thrust of Appellant's argument claiming bias
and prejudice on the part of the jury against it seems to
be that it favored a "home town" resident (Tr. 10).
Howenr, the jurors selected to try the matter were complete strangers and lived entirely in the opposite, or
south, end of the county:
J errv l\Iarcellin, Park City, Utah; James
H. \Vats.on, Kamas, Utah; Mildred Bair, Park
Citv, Utah; Paul A. Hamilton, Park City, Utah;
Pitt, Kamas, Utah; Donald Pace, \Van-
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ship, Utah; Gary A. Kimball, Park City, Utah;
Lawrence Burton, Oakley, Utah. (R. 107)

A simple reference to any Utah map will rcn::al
lliat the juror residing at 'Vanship, being the closest
poiut of residence of any juror to that of the respondents,
was approximately 15 miles distant! This would hardly
constitute a "home town" jury by any means.
Plaintiff cites the case of Porcupine Rescrviur Co.
Lloyd JV. Keller Corporation, 15 Utah 2d 318,
l'. 2<l 620 ( 1964), to support its position that the size of
a jury Yerdict suggests passion or prejudice. In that
case a new trial was ordered by this Court after the trial
j u<lge had conditioned his order granting a new trial
upon the acceptance of an additur. The significant factor
in that case is that the jury had awarded a sum for seYerance damages less than that testified to V!J ((/l!) witness.
To this Court it was obvious that such an award was the
product of passion or prejudice or a misunderstandiny uf
the law or facts presented.
Z'.

Plaintiff could also cite the case of State Ru(/d
Cu111m'n. v. Silliman, 22 U.2d 33, 448 P. 2d 347, where
the jmy verdict was set aside as being in eJ:cess of that
testified to by an!) witness (including the landowner).
This Court held the verdict was therefore excessiYe
"as a matter of law." It noted that, otherwise, the Yerdict could not be set aside unless so excessive as to
Le shocking to one's conscience. The Silliman case,
too, presented a factual situation entirely different from
the case at issue.
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CONCLUSION
Basic lo a consideration of this matter is that appellant filed a l\Iotion for New Trial and a Motion for
Hemittitur subsequent to the entry of the jury verdict.
J uclge Joseph E. Nelson denied both motions.
trial judge having the long experience and
knowledge possessed by Judge Nelson, having heard
all of the evidence, and having observed the demeanor
of the witnesses, is most certainly in a yery adYantageous
position to make a proper ruling as to the sufficienc,1;
uf the evidence - - the only real issue and a matter
particularly within the province of the trial judge.
The trial was exceptionally "clean" from the standpoint of litigated issues of law; consequently, since
appellant's position is predicated upon matters which
were peculiarly within the observance and knowledge
of the trial judge, the refusal to grant a new trial
and the further refusal to alter the amount of the
verdict clearly shows that Judge Nelson felt Mr. Dillree-s testimony to be very adequate in every way to support the verdict and that there was no exhibition of bias
or prejudice on the part of the jury. Appellant in substance is asking this Court to overrule the factual findings and considerations of both the jury and the trial
judge.
1 \..

It is submitted that the Verdict and the .J udgmeu t
on the Verdict should stand.
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Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents
15 East 4th South

Salt Lake City, Utah
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